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Abstract—Neural networks are becoming increasingly preva-
lent in software, and it is therefore important to be able to
verify their behavior. Because verifying the correctness of neural
networks is extremely challenging, it is common to focus on the
verification of other properties of these systems. One important
property, in particular, is robustness. Most existing definitions
of robustness, however, focus on the worst-case scenario where
the inputs are adversarial. Such notions of robustness are too
strong, and unlikely to be satisfied by—and verifiable for—
practical neural networks. Observing that real-world inputs to
neural networks are drawn from non-adversarial probability
distributions, we propose a novel notion of robustness: prob-
abilistic robustness, which requires the neural network to be
robust with at least (1 − ) probability with respect to the
input distribution. This probabilistic approach is practical and
provides a principled way of estimating the robustness of a
neural network. We also present an algorithm, based on abstract
interpretation and importance sampling, for checking whether a
neural network is probabilistically robust. Our algorithm uses
abstract interpretation to approximate the behavior of a neural
network and compute an overapproximation of the input regions
that violate robustness. It then uses importance sampling to
counter the effect of such overapproximation and compute an
accurate estimate of the probability that the neural network
violates the robustness property.
Index Terms—neural networks; probabilistic; robustness
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural networks are increasingly becoming an important
computational component of modern software. With their
widespread adoption, it has become essential that we ensure
(or at least gain confidence in) the correctness of neural net-
works, as we do with traditional programs. However, providing
formal specifications of correctness is an even harder task
for neural networks than for traditional programs, as neural
networks are explicitly designed for the purpose of learning
patterns in training data that are not easily apparent to humans.
Despite the difficulty of specifying the concept of correct-
ness for neural networks, there are some important properties
that such networks should satisfy. In particular, in recent years,
researchers have observed certain undesirable neural network
behaviors, including susceptibility to input perturbations [1],
unfairness of neural network outcomes [2], [3], and leakage
of private information (confidentiality and integrity issues) [4],
[5]. In this work, we focus on the property of robustness of
neural networks to input perturbations.
An important concept, in the context we target, is input
perturbation: a subtle perturbation of an input such that the
behavior of the neural network is correct on the unperturbed
input but incorrect on the perturbed one. Existing literature has
focused on the worst-case scenario where the perturbations
are adversarial, without regard to whether such adversarial
inputs are likely to be generated by real-world processes.
Accordingly, a variety of adversarial perturbations/attacks,
and defenses against such attacks, have been proposed (see
[6] for a survey). Further, a variety of formal definitions of
adversarial robustness have been presented. Broadly speaking,
these adversarial formulations can be classified into two main
groups: (i) local robustness and (ii) global robustness.
Intuitively, local robustness [7]–[9] is defined for a given
input x and states that the neural network should produce the
same result (e.g., label) for x and for all inputs x′ within a
ball of radius δ centered at x. (Notice that this definition relies
on a suitable distance metric defined over the input space.)
The requirement to be robust for all inputs that are δ-close
to x (i.e., within distance δ from x) might make sense under
certain threat models. In practice, however, for neural networks
operating in non-malicious settings, this can be too strong a
requirement; all δ-close inputs may not be equally likely, and
violating robustness for a highly unlikely x′ may be considered
practically acceptable. At the same time, since local robustness
is only defined for specific inputs and provides no guarantees
for the inputs that have not been considered, it can also be too
weak and inherently limited. Global robustness [9] addresses
this issue by further demanding that the local robustness
property be satisfied by all the inputs in the input space. In
addition to being computationally intractable to check, global
robustness is again too strong to be of practical use.
To address the practical and conceptual limitations of these
existing definitions of adversarial robustness for neural net-
works, we propose a new robustness property, probabilistic
robustness, that is targeted towards non-adversarial settings
and is globally defined. Our formulation is motivated by two
observations: (i) inputs to a neural network are generated
according to an (either known or unknown)1 underlying real-
world probability distribution over the input space; and (ii) in
1Although proving probabilistic robustness requires the underlying input
distribution to be known, in the absence of such information we can rely on
a standard known distribution.
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non-adversarial settings, we are only interested in robustness
of a neural network for pairs of δ-close inputs that are likely
to be generated in the real-world. Consequently, instead of
proving robustness for either arbitrary or all δ-close inputs, we
propose to prove robustness for pairs of δ-close inputs such
that their cumulative probability is at least (1−). Such a proof
guarantees that, for a random pair of δ-close inputs drawn from
the input distribution, the probability that the neural networks
violates robustness is  at the most. We believe that, com-
pared to local and global robustness, probabilistic robustness
represents a more practical and efficiently checkable property.
Moreover, unlike local robustness, this property is globally
defined. Finally, the parameter  is a tunable knob that can be
used to control the trade-off between computational efficiency
and strength of the property.
The description we just provided gives an intuitive idea of
probabilistic robustness. More formally, probabilistic robust-
ness can be expressed by the following formula:
Pr
x,x′∼D
(‖f(x′)−f(x)‖ ≤ k ∗‖x′−x‖ ∣∣ ‖x′−x‖ ≤ δ) ≥ 1− 
Here, f stands for the mathematical function represented by
the neural network, and f(x) represents the output generated
by the neural network on input x. ‖·‖ represents the norm or
distance metric used over the input and output space (assuming
that the same metric is used for both). This definition states
that for a randomly sampled pair of inputs, conditioned on
the inputs being δ-close, function f satisfies the Lipschitz
property; that is, the distance between the outputs is bounded
by a k-multiple of the distance between the inputs, with a
high probability (1− ). In other words, and more intuitively,
probabilistic robustness requires that pairs of inputs that are (1)
drawn from the real-world and (2) close to each other, result
in outputs that are similarly close with a high probability. Note
that this definition does not apply when the output is discrete
or categorical, and we assume that the output is a real vector.
This assumption, however, does not affect the applicability
of our technique; as we further explain in Section III, even
neural networks that produce categorical outputs can be treated
as producing a distribution over the class labels as an output
(using a soft-max as a final layer, for instance).
To check whether a given neural network satisfies prob-
abilistic robustness, a naive verification algorithm would run
the network against every δ-close pair of inputs and check and
record whether the Lipschitz property is satisfied. It would
then compute the total probability of all the recorded pairs
of inputs and check whether this probability is greater than
(1−). Obviously, this algorithm would be impractical, as the
input space of neural networks can be arbitrarily large.
To make our approach feasible, we present an algorithm that
combines abstract interpretation [10] (from programming lan-
guages theory) and importance sampling [11] (from statistical
theory) and makes the verification of probabilistic robustness
computationally tractable. Abstract interpretation can take as
input (the precise description of) a program with possibly
infinite behaviors and generate a finite, sound, precise, and
computable approximation of the program behaviors; we use
f(x¯) := W · x¯+ b¯
| case E1 : f1(x¯), ..., case Ek : fk(x¯))
| f(f ′(x))
E := E ∧ E | xi ≥ xj | xi ≥ 0 | xi < 0
Fig. 1. Definition of CAT functions.
abstract interpretation to approximate the behavior of a neural
network without running it on all possible inputs. Importance
sampling is a sampling technique that helps improve the
precision of statistical estimates, while reducing the number of
samples necessary to compute the estimate; we use importance
sampling to estimate the probability of all the input pairs that
satisfy the property.
The contributions of this work are twofold. First, we pro-
pose probabilistic robustness, a new non-adversarial robustness
property of neural networks. Second, we present a practical al-
gorithm for checking whether a network satisfies this property.
II. BACKGROUND
Neural networks are functions that map real-valued vector
inputs to real-valued vector outputs. In this paper, we use
the conditional affine transformations (CAT) representation of
neural networks [7], [12], shown in Figure 1. CAT functions
consist of functions f : Rm 7→ Rn, where m,n ∈ N, and
are recursively defined. Any affine transformation f(x¯) :=
W · x¯ + b¯, for matrix W and vector b¯, is a CAT function.
Conditional expressions with multiple cases, and composition
of CAT functions, are CAT functions. There is a straight-
forward translation of neural networks with ReLU activation
functions [13] and standard layer types (e.g., fully connected
layer, convolutional layer, and max pooling layer) into CAT
functions (see Gehr et al.’s work [12] for details).
Abstract interpretation [10] is a framework for under-
standing and proving properties about programs with poten-
tially infinite behaviors. Abstract interpretation techniques can
soundly approximate these behaviors in a finite, computable
way. Although the details of abstract interpretation are beyond
the scope of this paper, we provide an example to intuitively
explain the approach. Consider a function f : Rm 7→ Rn,
where m,n ∈ N, and a set C ⊆ Rn. Suppose that we want
to find the largest set X ⊆ Rm such that ∀x ∈ X.f(x) ∈ C.
If f is invertible, one way to compute X is by computing
F−1(C), where F−1 : P (Rn) 7→ P (Rm), and F−1(Y ) =
{x|f(x) ∈ Y }. F−1 is just a lifting of f−1 to be over a
set of outputs Y , rather than a single output y, and is called
the concrete backward transformer. If F−1 has an efficient
representation, F−1(C) can be computed efficiently, but F−1
itself can be very inefficient (even non-terminating). Using
abstract interpretation, we can design an abstract backward
transformer Fˆ−1 such that computing Fˆ−1(Cˆ) = Xˆ is
guaranteed to be efficient, and C ⊆ Cˆ and X ⊆ Xˆ (i.e., Cˆ and
Xˆ) are sound overapproximations of C and X , respectively.
Importance sampling [11] is a sampling technique for
estimating unlikely properties of distributions. In particular, if
the region in which the property holds has a low probability,
vanilla Monte Carlo sampling is very unlikely to produce
points from within that region; one is forced to either gen-
erate a large number of samples, or accept a very imprecise
(large variance) estimate of the property under consideration.
Importance sampling can help in such a situation. Instead of
sampling from the original distribution, we (1) sample from
a distribution that attaches a high probability to the region of
interest, (2) estimate the property for this new distribution,
and (3) weight this estimate so as to generate the estimate for
the original distribution. In many cases, importance sampling
can help generate precise estimates with much fewer samples
compared to vanilla Monte Carlo sampling.
III. PROBABILISTIC ROBUSTNESS
As we stated earlier, existing formulations of neural network
robustness are focused on the worst-case (i.e., the adversarial
setting). Practically, these formulations are not only too strong,
but also computationally expensive to verify. Our formulation
of probabilistic robustness aims to find a practical notion of
robustness that is suitable for non-adversarial settings and is
computationally efficient to verify.
To contrast our formulation with the existing ones, we first
provide a formal definition of local and global robustness. A
neural network satisfies local robustness at input x0 if the
following formula holds true:
∀x.‖x0 − x‖ ≤ δ =⇒ f(x0) = f(x)
In the formula, f is the mathematical function represented by
the neural network, and ‖·‖ is a distance metric defined on the
input space. Intuitively, the formula states that for all inputs in
the ball of radius δ centered at x0, the network produces the
same output. Note that input x0 must be explicitly provided.
Because there is no principled guidance on which inputs to
select, such inputs are typically selected in an ad-hoc fashion.
Global robustness basically consists of enforcing local
robustness for every input in the input space and can be
expressed as follows:
∀x, x′.‖x− x′‖ ≤ δ =⇒ f(x) = f(x′)
Because this formula is universally quantified over both x and
x′, this property tends to be too strong to be of practical use—
most real-world neural networks are likely to violate it.
In contrast, a neural network satisfies probabilistic robust-
ness if the following formula holds true,
Pr
x,x′∼D
(‖f(x′)−f(x)‖ ≤ k∗‖x′−x‖) ∣∣ ‖x′−x‖ ≤ δ) ≥ 1−
In the formula, D indicates the input distribution. Probabilistic
robustness differs from local and global robustness in two
major ways. First, instead of requiring that the neural net-
work produces equal output on multiple different inputs, this
property bounds the distance between every pair of outputs in
terms of the distance between the corresponding pair of inputs.
(A function satisfying this property over its entire domain is
referred to as a Lipschitz continuous function). Second, the
property is not established for arbitrary or all δ-close inputs.
Instead, to prove the property, one needs to establish it for
pairs of δ-close inputs with a total probability of at least
(1 − ) with respect to the distribution D. In case the exact
underlying distribution is unknown, which is likely to be the
common case, one can prove this property for some standard
distribution and still infer useful information about the neural
network. Note that, because the notion of Lipschitz continuity
does not apply to functions with a discrete or categorical
output, we require that the output of the neural network be
continuous. However, this does not practically restrict the class
of neural networks that we can consider; even neural networks
that act as classifiers typically produce a real-valued vector
as output, where each element k of the vector represents the
probability of the input having label k.
IV. ALGORITHM
Algorithm 1: Checking Probabilistic Robustness.
Input: f : Neural network as a CAT function.
D: Input distribution.
: Probabilistic error bound.
k: Lipschitz constant.
Output: {T,F}
1 pf := ConstructProduct(f);
2 φ := ¬(‖f(x′)− f(x)‖ ≤ k ∗ ‖x′ − x‖));
3 poly := AbstractInterpret(pf, φ);
4 err := 0;
5 foreach p ∈ poly do
6 e := SampleAndEstimate(p, pf, φ,D);
7 err := err + e;
8 end foreach
9 if err >  then
10 return F;
11 else
12 return T;
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for checking the prob-
abilistic robustness of a neural network f . f is input to the
algorithm and is expressed in the form of a CAT function
(see Section II). The other inputs to the algorithm are the
probabilistic error bound , the Lipschitz constant k, and the
input distribution D. D can either be represented as a closed
form function, or as a probabilistic program, depending on the
algorithm implementation. The algorithm outputs T (true) if
f satisfies probabilistic robustness, and F (false) otherwise.
Our algorithm frames the problem of checking the proba-
bilistic robustness of a neural network as a relational program
verification problem [14]. Relational verification is defined
as checking program properties or specifications that are ex-
pressed over pairs of program traces. For instance, probabilis-
tic robustness requires comparing the outputs (‖f(x′)−f(x)‖)
generated by a neural network for pairs of inputs (‖x′ − x‖).
Such two-trace properties are also called hyperproperties [15].
A majority of program verification and analysis techniques
are only applicable to single-trace properties. To be able to use
such techniques for checking hyperproperties, a standard trick
used in program verification is to construct a product program
[16]. For a program P , a product program is constructed by
creating a copy P ′ of P , where all the variables are renamed,
and composing P and P ′ together to get program P ;P ′. A
hyperproperty of the original program then corresponds to a
single-trace property of the product program.
The first step of our algorithm is to construct a “product”
neural network pf (line 1) by encoding two copies of the
original network f side by side. Assume that the input and the
output of the original neural network f are notated as x¯ and y¯,
respectively. Then, intuitively, the product neural network (1)
accepts the input (x¯, x¯′), (2) independently processes x¯ and
x¯′, and (3) produces the output (y¯, y¯′), such that y¯=f(x¯) and
y¯′=f(x¯′). This product construction enables us to use standard
abstract interpretation techniques for checking a hyperproperty
such as robustness. Note that, as we just discussed, any input
for the product neural network represents a pair of inputs
for the original neural network. In the rest of this section,
we therefore use the term input to refer to a product neural
network input.
In line 2, the algorithm assigns the temporary name φ
to the property to be checked, that is, the negation of
the Lipschitz property. The backwards abstract interpreter
AbstractInterpret produces the set poly (line 3) as an
overapproximation of the set of inputs that satisfy φ. Since
φ is the negation of the Lipschitz property, all the in-
puts NOT in poly satisfy the Lipschitz property. Because
AbstractInterpret is based on the powerset polyhedra
abstract domain [17], [18], which uses a set of polyhedra to
approximate a set of real-valued vectors, the set poly produced
by the abstract interpreter is a set of input polyhedra.
Next, for each input polyhedron p in poly, the algorithm
applies importance sampling to improve the precision of the
results. As we discussed above, each polyhedron p computed
through abstract interpretation is an overapproximation of the
set of inputs that satisfy φ (i.e., the set of inputs that violate
the Lipschitz property). To reduce imprecision, the algorithm
samples inputs from within p, and uses these samples to
estimate the probability e of inputs in p satisfying φ. For each
sample, the sampling procedure first checks if the distance
between the two elements comprising the sample input is more
than δ. If so, the sample is rejected. Otherwise, the sample is
accepted. For each accepted sample, the sampling procedure
checks if the sample satisfies φ. The probability estimate e
is the average weighted probability of the samples satisfying
φ, where the weighted probability depends on the size of p
and on the input distribution D. Finally, after processing all
polyhedra, the algorithm checks the value of err, which is
the total probability of satisfying φ. If err is greater than ,
the probability of violating the Lipschitz property is greater
than , neural network f is not probabilistically robust, and
the algorithm returns F (lines 9–10). Otherwise, f satisfies
the property, and the algorithm returns T (lines 11–12).
V. CONCLUSION
We presented probabilistic robustness, a novel formulation
of robustness of neural networks that is practical, yet princi-
pled. Probabilistic robustness guarantees that a neural network
is robust with at least (1 − ) probability, given a real-world
input probability distribution. In contrast to existing notions
of robustness, probabilistic robustness focuses on a non-
adversarial setting. We also presented an algorithm based on
abstract interpretation and importance sampling for checking
whether a neural network is probabilistically robust. We are
currently implementing our algorithm and plan to evaluate the
usefulness of our approach on real-world neural networks.
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